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Philosophie antique, n° 15 (2015), 205-224 
BO ETH U S TH E EPIC U REAN * 
Francesco VERDE 
“Sapienza” Università di Roma 
RÉSUMÉ. Cet article se concentre principalement sur Boéthos, philosophe épi-
curien qui a été souvent négligé : aucune source ancienne, excepté Plutarque, ne le 
mentionne. L’étude tente d’examiner la perspective philosophique de Boéthos et, 
plus particulièrement, son attitude envers la géométrie.  
SUMMARY. This paper mainly focuses on the (rather neglected) Epicurean Boe-
thus, not mentioned by any ancient source except Plutarch. The article aims to exa-
mine the views of this philosopher, more specifically his attitude towards geometry.
!
* I wish to thank Tiziano Dorandi, Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, Michel Narcy, David Sed-
ley, Emidio Spinelli, and the anonymous referee of  Philosophie antique for their very gene-
rous and helpful remarks on a version of this paper. I also extend my gratitude to Samuel 
H. Baker who checked my English. 

  
 
As is well known, the existence of a positive Epicurean geometry is an 
extremely controversial question that has been discussed at length by 
scholars. That the Epicureans dealt with geometry in order to refute its 
veracity (and usefulness) is beyond doubt.1 It is more difficult to ascertain 
whether the Epicureans ever positively theorized a peculiar geometric doc-
trine mainly aimed at legitimizing or otherwise improving an aspect of 
their philosophy. The sources on this issue are very scarce, and especially 
difficult to interpret; judging from my previous investigations, it seems to 
me that the meticulous study of these Epicurean texts makes it very 
plausible that the Epicureans were genuinely interested in geometry not 
only because they wished to refute it, but also because it helped them to 
develop their own theoretical proposal based on the fundamental criterion 
of solida utilitas (Cic. Fin. I 21, 71-72 = 227 Us.).2 While this is an 
(attractive) hypothesis, claiming that Epicureanism completely dismissed 
the sciences (mathemata) means having a rather partial view, which fails to 
take account of the available evidence. Within Epicureanism the sciences 
are pursued and studied in depth if and only if they are useful as a means to 
justify (or clarify) a specific philosophical doctrine or theory. The most 
famous and striking case concerns the study of nature: from Epicurus’ 
Principal Doctrine, 11, we learn that the study of nature is not necessary as 
a theoretical pursuit in itself, but is directly oriented towards ethics.3 
Consequently, according to Epicurean thought all science, if it is actually 
useful, contributes directly (as well as indirectly) to the ultimate end of 
philosophy according to Epicurus: attaining stable and enduring 
imperturbability (ataraxia). 
!
1. See Bénatouïl, 2010. 
2. See Verde 2013a, p. 249-308 et Verde 2013b. For a different view, see the significant 
and stimulating (but still unpublished) paper by Netz forthcoming (I wish to thank the 
author for giving me the opportunity to read this important contribution in advance).  
3. Cf. Cic. Fin. IV 5, 11-12. See too Spinelli 2012, and now Parisi 2014. 
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The contents of (presumed or probable) Epicurean geometry funda-
mentally elude us because of the scarcity of sources. However, just to limit 
ourselves to one example, on the basis of some important passages from 
Sextus’ Against the Geometers (M III 100-101; 104; 106) it seems as though 
the Epicureans developed some definitions of angle that (significantly) em-
ployed the concept of minimal part (elachiston). Epicurus wrote an entire 
work On the Angle in the Atom (Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ γωνίας: Diog. Laert. X 
28); it cannot be excluded that his interest in the theory of the angle had to 
do not only with the internal structure of atoms (as the title of the work 
seems to suggest) and, therefore, with the doctrine of atomic minima, but 
also with the theory of clinamen (the swerve).4 Of course, one could argue 
that definitions of this kind are not good enough evidence for us to claim 
that the Epicureans possessed a positive geometry. While this is a reaso-
nable objection, it makes it difficult to understand why the Epicureans – 
and (perhaps) Epicurus himself, as we have seen from the title of one of his 
works, whose contents, unfortunately, we do not know – provided several 
definitions of the angle, if these were ultimately unnecessary or even alien 
to their own philosophical system. If, on the contrary, this reconstruction 
is plausible, it seems clear that the definitions of angle are an important 
clue of the existence of an Epicurean “geometric proposal”. Here we have 
an example of the fact that, if the definitions of angle are indeed Epicurean 
and if these are really related to the internal structure of atoms and to the 
clinamen motion, geometry is strictly connected to the science of nature: 
through the definitions of angle that explicitly use the (Epicurean) notion 
of minimal part, geometry succeeds in explaining why the atom declines 
only at a minimum degree (cf. Lucret. II 243-245: quare etiam atque etiam 
paulum inclinare necessest/corpora; nec plus quam minimum, ne fingere mo-
tus/obliquos videamur et id res vera refutet). Geometry,5 therefore, is used to 
support a crucial physical doctrine which, in turn, helps to justify a decisive 
ethical doctrine: the existence of libera voluntas (Lucret. II 256-257).6  
!
4. See Giovacchini 2010. 
5. Furthermore, from a terminological point of view, in order to understand better what 
kind of geometry is being talked about, one could call this discipline a particular “physics of 
space” rather “geometry”: as a matter of fact, one can deal with angles, lines, etc. in a way 
compatible with (Epicurean) canonic and atomism, since stricto sensu it is difficult to 
imagine something called “geometry” which would be fully compatible with Epicurean on-
tology and epistemology (empiricism, criticism of demonstration and definition; see again 
Verde 2013b, p. 141-145). In this article for convenience I continue to call “geometry” this 
particular physics of space, that makes use of geometric principles and notions. 
6. A deep analysis of the sources, therefore, proves not only the likelihood of (positive) 
Epicurean geometry, but also the fact that, according to the Epicureans, this discipline, 
albeit very technical, was closely linked to the science of nature (physiologia). 
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Thanks to some Herculaneum scrolls, and the decisive testimony from 
Proclus’ Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s “Elements” (see below, 
219), we learn the name of some Epicurean philosophers who were cer-
tainly acquainted with geometry – for example, Philonides of Laodicea, 
Zeno of Sidon and Demetrius Laco. Some passages from Plutarch, in ad-
dition, are especially valuable because they bear witness to the existence of 
an Epicurean geometer named Boethus, not mentioned by any other 
ancient source. The purpose of this article, therefore, is quite straight-
forward: to reconstruct the views of this philosopher, and in particular his 
attitude towards geometry, on the basis of the little information provided 
by Plutarch (who, as is well known, is a rather problematic source, given his 
clear loathing for Epicureanism).7 I will not attempt to draw a complete 
profile of Boethus, but I will instead just focus on his geometrical interests.  
The first significant passage comes from Plutarch’s The Oracles at Del-
phi no Longer Given in Verse (396D-E): 
῾Ὑπολαβὼν οὖν Βόηθος ὁ γεωμέτρης (οἶσθα γὰρ τὸν ἄνδρα μεταταττόμενον 
ἤδη πρὸς τὸν ᾽Ἐπίκουρον)… 
At this point Boethus the geometer entered into the conversation. (You 
know that the man is already changing his allegiance in the direction of 
Epicureanism.)8 
 Plutarch introduces Boethus who, in answer to the Stoic philosopher 
Sarapion, raises cogent (and traditionally Epicurean)9 arguments against 
the Delphi oracle, and against divination more generally. Strangely enough, 
in the dialogue Plutarch is not hostile to Boethus (or the other Epi-
cureans): this suggests that the Epicurean philosopher was a friend of 
Plutarch’s, or, at any rate, a personality worthy of respect.10 It is crucial to 
note that Boethus is described as ὁ γεωμέτρης and that at the same time he 
is said to side with Epicurus now (ἤδη).11 
!
7. For a first overview on this matter see the recent studies by Corti 2014, p. 21-28, and 
Kechagia-Ovseiko 2014.  
8.  Transl. Babbitt 1969 (slightly modified).  
9. See Ferrari 2000, p. 149-163. This is very clear in the writing of the Epicurean Dio-
genianus (2nd AC?), who writes against Chrysippus’ fatalism and mantic art: see Isnardi 
Parente 1990. Also Philodemus, especially in his treatise On Gods, deals with Stoic divi-
nation in order to criticize it, often by quoting some passages from Stoic works and showing 
how the theory of divination and providence of the Stoics contradicts their theology (name-
ly their notion of God): see now Essler 2014.  
10. See Flacelière 1959, p. 201-202; Del Corno 1983, p. 53; Hershbell 1992, p. 3355; 
Babut 2003 p. 275-277; Boulogne 2003, p. 18, 22, 37, and Koch 2005, p. 49. 
11. The fact that Plutarch calls Boethus “geometer” could imply that Boethus kept 
using geometry after becoming Epicurean: if Boethus is an Epicurean philosopher, why does 
Plutarch continue to call him “geometer”? I believe that a plausible explanation is that Plu-
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The second passage is from Book 5 of Plutarch’s Table-Talk (673C). 
Here Plutarch informs us that the conversation is held in the Athenian 
house (ἐν ᾽Ἀθήναις) of the Epicurean Boethus (παρὰ Βοήθῳ τῷ ᾽Ἐπι-
κουρείῳ), where many Epicureans are gathered (συνεδείπνουν δ’ οὐκ ὀλίγοι 
τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως).12 The debated question (occasioned by the victory of 
the comedy writer Strato, apparently unknown)13 concerns the fact that we 
feel pleasure in hearing actors representing anger and pain, but we do not 
derive any pleasure at all from the sight of people actually experiencing 
these emotions. While the (Epicurean) interlocutors are convinced that 
the imitator can communicate pleasure and delight because he does not 
personally experience the suffering he portrays, Plutarch believes that this 
view is inadequate. He maintains that we possess an affinity for any perfor-
mance that exhibits reason or artistry, and admire its success. According to 
Plutarch, people require no instruction in order to be attracted to subtlety 
and cleverness; as a matter of fact, if a person shows to a child a shapeless 
lump of silver, while another brings him a little silver animal or cup, it is 
certain that the child will prefer and be drawn to the latter. Similarly we 
feel acute pain at the sight of the sick or dying, but a painting of Philoctetes 
or statue of Jocasta will give us pleasure – indeed, we will feel admiration 
for these works. To criticize the position of the Epicureans, at the end of 
his argument Plutarch points out that his position is really good evidence 
in favour of the Cyrenaics (with whom the followers of Epicurus polemi-
cize): for according to the Cyrenaics we receive pleasure from sights and 
sounds not through our sight or hearing, but in our minds.14 It is interes-
ting to note that the discussion of issues of this kind related to poetics (a 
subject already studied by Plato and Aristotle)15 takes place in a circle of 
Epicureans of the Imperial Age: this may provide important confirmation 
!
tarch makes use of the term “geometer” in order to identify distinctly and without am-
biguity Boethus. On the basis of De Pyth. or. 396D (but above all 397C: […] ὑμᾶς τοὺς τοῦ 
᾽Ἐπικούρου προφήτας (δῆλος γὰρ εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποφερόμενος) […]) Fuhrmann 1978 suggests 
the hypothesis that Boethus’ conversion into Epicureanism might have been rather recent 
(p. 49). This could be another likely reason to explain Plutarch’s definition of Boethus as ὁ 
γεωμέτρης. 
12. On the presence of Boethus in Athens as a significant testimony of the vitality of 
Athenian Epicureanism at the time of Plutarch, see Graindor 1931, p. 153. Graindor be-
lieves that Boethus might have been the son or descendant of the Peripatetic Boethus of 
Sidon, a hypothesis which does not seem convincing to me in the absence of any concrete 
evidence. On Epicureanism of Imperial Age see Erler 2009. 
13. This might be the Menandrian actor Q. Marcius Strato of the deme of Chollidae 
(see Teodorsson 1990, p. 147).  
14. On this matter see Warren 2013.  
15. See Plato Resp. X. 605c9-607a7; Aristot. Poet. 1448b8-19. Plutarch examines the 
same topic in Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeatμ 17F-18C too. 
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of the fact that even the Epicureans dealt with poetics on the basis of 
specific theories, and that Boethus perhaps had a specific interest in this 
matter. In citing the position of the Cyrenaics Plutarch seems to suggest, 
moreover, that the problem of poetics is related to the theory of knowledge 
(and indirectly also to physics): it is not possible to rule out that Boethus 
may have been interested in poetics chiefly because of its epistemological 
implications.  
The last passage is from Book 8 of Table-Talk (720E-F=323 Us.):16 
῾Ἡσυχίας δὲ γενομένης Βόηθος ἔφη νέος μὲν ὢν ἔτι καὶ σοφιστεύων ἀπὸ γεω-
μετρίας αἰτήμασι χρῆσθαι (F) καὶ λαμβάνειν ἀναποδείκτους ὑποθέσεις, νυνὶ δὲ 
χρήσεσθαί τισι τῶν προαποδεδειγμένων ὑπ’ ῾Ἐπικούρου. 
When silence fell, Boethus said that when he was still young and occupied 
with sophistic pursuits, he had been accustomed to using postulates from 
geometry and adopting unproved hypotheses, but that he would now em-
ploy some of the demonstrated doctrines of Epicurus.17 
The problem under examination is why sounds can be heard better at night 
than in the morning. The conversation – which gives a strong impression 
of historicity18 – takes place in the house of Plutarch’s master Ammonius in 
Athens, and is occasioned by the fact that Ammonius is being boisterously 
cheered by a crowd of people after his third appointment as strategos 
(“general”).19 The original problem, then, is why those who are inside hear 
those screaming outside, while the latter cannot hear those inside equally 
well. Ammonius recalls that this issue has already been solved by 
Aristotle:20 the voice coming from inside weakens and dissipates when it 
goes outside in the open air, whereas the voice that goes from the outside to 
the inside remains clear. Given that the problem has already been treated 
by Aristotle, the discussion moves on to the reasons why voices at night are 
!
16. Plutarch’s passage is found in Usener’s Epicurean collection, but it was not included 
by Bailey or Arrighetti in their editions.  
17. Transl. Minar 1961 (modified). 
18. See Teodorsson 1996, p. 181. 
19. According to Graindor 1931 (p. 78), Ammonius was appointed strategos for the 
third time in 81 AC, a date which coincides, therefore, with one of Plutarch’s stays in 
Athens.  
20. The reference is to Ps.-Aristot. Probl. XI, 903b13-18. Plutarch here does not address 
the problem of the authorship of this work, which he simply attributes to Aristotle (cf. 
below n. 35). On the authenticity of Problemata I shall merely refer to the research con-
ducted by Louis 1991 (p. XXIII-XXX), whose results have been usefully summed up by 
Quarantotto 2011, p. 23 n. 1.  
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more sonorous and clear.21 Ammonius (in a “Platonic” way, one might 
add)22 attributes this fact to providence:23 at night when sight is of little use, 
hearing becomes clearer and purer, since the perception removed from the 
eyes is returned to the ears. However, since one must discover the causes 
necessarily produced by nature (720E: τὰ δι’ ἀνάγκης φύσει περαινόμενα τῶν 
αἰτίων ἀνευρίσκειν), and given that it is the natural philosopher who deals 
with the material and instrumental principles (τοῦ φυσικοῦ ἴδιόν ἐστιν, ἡ πε-
ρὶ τὰς ὑλικὰς καὶ ὀργανικὰς ἀρχὰς πραγματεία), Ammonius asks the audience 
whether anyone is able to provide a convincing explanation of the problem 
(πρῶτος ὑμῶν εὐπορήσειεν λόγου τὸ πιθανὸν ἔχοντος;). It is very interesting to 
note that only Boethus answers this request: it is as though he felt singled 
out by Ammonius – and this, for at least four reasons. (1) Firstly, Am-
monius refers to the natural philosopher and it is well known that ac-
cording to the Epicureans natural science or physiologia is the very heart of 
philosophy. (2) Ammonius’ reference to providence evidently arouses “re-
pulsion” from an Epicurean such as Boethus, who on other occasions had 
sharply criticized divination and fate.24 (3) Ammonius also draws attention 
to material and instrumental causes, and for the Epicureans the concept of 
cause plays a basic role, as we learn, for example, from a passage of the Let-
ter to Herodotus (§ 78): the primary task of physiologia or the science of na-
ture is the careful – and “Aristotelian”, one might add –  investigation (ἐξα-
κριβῶσαι) of the cause of the most important (τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτία) (phy-
sical) issues, hence of fundamental phenomena.25 (4) Finally, in the Letter 
to Pythocles (§ 87), which deals with the theory of multiple explanations for 
!
21. In fact this argument too is examined in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata (XI, 
903a 7-26). The first explanation is offered by Anaxagoras (59 A 74 DK): in the morning, 
the air heated by the sun reverberates, while at night it is quieter because the sun has set.  
22. On Ammonius’ Platonism (not very different from Plutarch’s) see Donini 1986 
(= 2011). 
23. On Plutarch’s appeal to the notion of providence see Opsomer 1997. About Am-
monius’ deep religiosity and involvement in public religion, see Jones 1967, and Follet 1976, 
p. 162-166. 
24. See above, 211. 
25. One could notice that this argument could be used in an opposite way too: the 
Epicureans are interested only in the causes of the most important phenomena and should 
thus not get interested in problems such as the one raised by Ammonius. On this topic see 
Philod. De elect. col. ΧΙΙΙ 17-19 Indelli-Tsouna McKirahan, who shows that one of the 
basic “principles” of physiologia (valid also in the field of ethics, in particular in relation to 
what it is necessary to choose or shun) concerns the fact that nothing is produced and has 
its fulfilment without a cause (χωρὶς αἰτίας). See too Lucret. VI, 50-55 (according to Flores’ 
text): cetera quae fieri in terris caeloque tuentur / mortales, pauidis cum pendent mentibus 
saepe / et faciunt animos humilis formidine diuom / depressosque premunt ad terram propterea 
quod / ignorantia causarum conferre deorum / cogit ad imperium res et concedere regnum.  
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celestial and meteorological phenomena, one finds a reference to τὸ πιθα-
νολογούμενον, i.e. that level of persuasiveness26 (in accordance with sense-
perception) which is the aim that the doctrine of multiple explanations 
must achieve. 27 
Plutarch introduces Boethus by saying that he is an Epicurean philo-
sopher who, when he was still young, took up sophistic pursuits (σοφισ-
τεύων);28 Boethus used the postulates of geometry (ἀπὸ γεωμετρίας αἰτήμασι 
χρῆσθαι) and also accepted unproved hypotheses (λαμβάνειν ἀναποδείκτους 
ὑποθέσεις). Hence some scholars believe that Boethus had originally studied 
at the Academy – which would explain why he was a friend of Plutarch’s – 
before converting to Epicureanism.29 Boethus’ geometrical interests have 
!
26. On this matter see Verde 2013 c, esp. p. 136. 
27. One objection that could be made is the following: on the basis of these reasons, one 
does not see how these motivations prove or suggest that Boethus (and, more generally, the 
Epicureans) should be interested in explaining why sounds are best heard at night. To 
answer, one could argue that this is a very specific topic; nevertheless we know that the Epi-
cureans were actually interested in specific physical problems too. Evidence of this can be 
found in the Letter to Pythocles, which is a doctrinal epitome containing several scientific ex-
planations of very specific meteorological topics. If a genuine Epicurean philosopher is in-
terested in a particular physical phenomenon, this happens because the purpose of every 
scientific research is exclusively ethical. However this does not imply that the investigations 
of the Epicureans in this field are not fully scientific inquiries (see Graham 2013, p. 211-
212). From this point of view, the explanation of why sound is best heard at night must be 
included in this same philosophical perspective, in order to avoid any providential, theo-
logical, or teleological explanations of a phenomenon of this kind: the crucial point is that  
more specific phenomena are reducible to atoms and void.  
28. In Imperial times the noun sophistes and the verb sophisteuo acquire particular mea-
nings: a sophistes can be a teacher of rhetoric, eloquence or oratory (within a school or not), 
or a learned man of questionable moral value. Plutarch often sharply distinguishes the phi-
losopher from the sophist, maintaining that the philosopher despises the value of rhetoric in 
general. Brunt 1994 (p. 38, see too p. 42-43) argues that «in the second century the term 
sophist is generally derogatory, when it does not denote a teacher of rhetoric, or occasionally 
a savant». I think that in the case of Boethus the term clearly has a derogatory meaning: 
Plutarch seems to be stressing the shrewd and none-too-serious (that is, non-philosophical) 
attitude of Boethus, since the latter postulates unproved hypotheses. At the same time, it 
cannot be completely ruled out that in this case sophisteuo means that Boethus taught geo-
metry. For the meaning of sophisteuo in the sense of “to teach” (often rhetoric, and of course 
at a fee) in Plutarch see Lucull. 22, 7; Caes. 3, 1; Demost. 24, 3; De Stoic. rep. 1047F; see e.g. 
too Diog. Laert. VIII 87 (= T 7 Lasserre) about Eudoxus’ teaching at Cyzicus and the Pro-
pontis (ἐντεῦθέν τε γενέσθαι ἐν Κυζίκῳ καὶ τῇ Προποντίδι σοφιστεύοντα).  
29. See e.g. Braccini and Pellizer 2014, 223. Several scholars have read – in my view, 
with little justification – the term σοφιστεύων in Quaest. conv. 720E as a clear reference to 
Boethus’ (early) Academic studies, translating it as «occupied with academic pursuits» 
(Minar 1961 in his “Loeb” translation, p. 133) or «il étudiait à l’Académie» (Frazier and 
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also been taken to denote a Pythagorean affinity on his part (prior to his 
joining Epicurus’ Garden).30 It is very likely that this view depends on the 
fact that for many scholars it is essentially inconceivable that an Epicurean 
philosopher might deal with geometry: hence the hypothesis of Boethus’ 
affiliation with the Academy or Pythagoreanism, although we have no sure 
evidence to substantiate such view. Nevertheless Boethus’ early affiliation 
with Academy seems a more plausible possibility, since according to Plu-
tarch the philosopher accepted unproved hypotheses, and this could recall 
the well known passages of Plato’s Republic Book VI (510c-e; see too Resp. 
VII, 533c, for the task of dialectics to ground and justify the hypotheses) 
about the (unproved) hypotheses of geometry, arithmetic, and similar 
sciences.31  
After taking the floor, Boethus deals with the problem raised by Am-
monius by presenting a doctrine that seems to express a genuinely ortho-
dox form of Epicureanism. This is evident from the very beginning, when 
Boethus, in reply to Ammonius’ question about causes and principles, ar-
gues that existing things are borne about in the non-existent (φέρεται τὰ 
ὄντ’ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι).32 This is a clear reference to the grounds of Epicurean 
atomism: atoms and the void.33 On the basis of these principles, Boethus 
!
Sirinelli 1996 in their “Les Belles Lettres” translation, p. 90). Teodorsson 1996 (p. 184) 
without any hesitation writes that Boethus «had formerly studied at the Academy, pro-
bably as a fellow student of Plutarch». There is also no concrete evidence that Boethus be-
longed or was close to the «Kreise des Ammonios» (Ziegler 1951, col. 669), or that he was 
«d’abord disciple d’Ammonios» (Puech 1992, p. 4842). What is much more likely, 
however, is the bond of friendship between Plutarch and Boethus: this might be a clue of 
Boethus’ background as a member of the Academy, where he may have trained to become a 
geometer. For a first survey on Academic geometry and its relationship with philosophy see 
Bénatouïl and El Murr 2010. 
30. See Ziegler 1951, col. 695-696, who also includes Boethus among the Pythagoreans, 
at least «in seinen Anfängen». This hypothesis is (rightly) ruled out by Hershbell 1984, 
p. 73-79: «There also seem to be no convincing reasons to regard Boethus, Erato, and Her-
meias as “Pythagoreans.” Boethus appears consistently as an Epicurean at Quaest. conviv. 
673C and 720E-F where in the latter passage he mentions his youthful interest in geometry, 
hardly a reason for considering him a former Pythagorean» (p. 73).  
31. For a first overview see Franco Repellini 2003, esp. p. 360-374. As David Sedley sug-
gested to me (per litteras), Boethus’ closing remark (721D: μηδεὶς ἐνιστάσθω πρὸς τὰς πρώτας 
ὑποθέσεις) is a bit surprising. Here Boethus calls “hypotheses” (perhaps ironically?) the pre-
demonstrated principles: one cannot rule out that these are the proved hypotheses, com-
pletely different from the (unproved) hypotheses of geometry.  
32. On the role played by void in Boethus’ argument see Boulogne 2003 p. 76. 
33. It is certainly interesting to observe that Boethus uses the terminological dichotomy 
“being”/“not being” to indicate the atoms and the void, something typical of ancient Ato-
mists (Leucippus and Democritus), especially judging from Aristotle’s evidence: see e.g. 
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explains that the void is mixed with atoms of air, and that heat, unlike cold, 
looses, separates and dissolves atomic concentrations. Consequently, in the 
morning, thanks to the heat these concentrations become dilated; in this 
way, the atoms of voices or sounds (that is the eidola/“images” or simu-
lacra)34 are hampered and hindered, causing them to disperse. During the 
night, on the contrary, the cold “coagulates” atoms: so the atoms of voices 
do not find any obstacles, and can more easily reach the listener. For the 
same reason, empty bodies transmit sound more effectively than full bo-
dies: gold and stones, being solid and dense bodies, retain sounds, while 
bronze, being less dense, is a much more sonorous material.35 Leaving aside 
!
Aristot. GC I 8, 325a23 (= 67 A 7 DK), and Simpl. In Aristot. De caelo 294, 33 Heiberg 
(= 208 Rose= 68 A 37 DK; see Sedley 1982). This reversion from Epicurean to Democri-
tean terminology is difficult to explain: as David Sedley supposed (per litteras), the being/ 
not-being dichotomy could be in aid of proving that the body/void dichotomy is logically 
exhaustive. But one also cannot rule out the possibility that Boethus claims that the body/ 
void dichotomy (at least at the very beginning of his speech) is a limiting and restrictive 
terminology. I am not persuaded by the idea that τὸ μὴ ὂν here simply «means ‘space’» 
(Teodorsson 1996, p. 185). Using the peculiar language of atomism, Boethus rather wishes 
to refer to the basic principles to which everything is reduced: in this sense τὸ μὴ ὂν means 
‘void’. There is, therefore, no contradiction with the next sentence, which indeed clarifies 
what these principles are: πολὺ γὰρ κενὸν ἐνδιέσπαρται καὶ μέμικται ταῖς τοῦ ἀέρος ἀτόμοις 
(720F). 
34. See Epicur. Hrdt. 52-53, and the commentary by Verde 2010, p. 140-145. 
35. The example of bronze and the sound it emits also occurs in another certainly Epi-
curean context (Sext. Emp. M VII 208 = 247 Us.). Already in Problemata (XI, 903a11-15) 
one of the explanations provided concerns the fact that through an empty space one hears 
better than in a full space: in the morning the air is dense and full of light and rays, whereas 
in the night, it is more rarefied and thin, because the fire and the rays (which are bodies, ac-
cording to the author) have gone away (διὰ τὸ ἀπεληλυθέναι ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὰς ἀκτῖνας, 
σώματα ὄντα). According to Aristotle (see De an. II 7, 418b13-20) light is not corporeal, 
whereas, according to the Peripatetic Strato of Lampsacus (see Simpl. In Aristot. Phys. IV 9, 
693, 10-29 Diels = 65a Wehrli = 30A Sharples, and Hero Pneum. 1, 24, 20-28 11 Schmidt 
= 65b Wehrli = 30B Sharples; cf. Sanders 2011, p. 274) and Epicurus (on the basis of 
Lucret. II, 381-390; cf. Longo 1987-1988), it is a body. This seems to be an indication of the 
fact that this section of the Problemata Physica cannot be easily attributed to Aristotle. The 
affinities of Section XI with the De audibilibus/Περὶ ἀκουστῶν (e.g. Louis 1991 p. 4-5) – a 
treatise attributed to Strato of Lampsacus by Gottschalk 1968 – have been taken to suggest 
that this part of the Problemata could properly be attributed to Strato. However, this 
hypothesis too should be regarded with extreme caution and probably re-examined, mainly 
because Strato’s authorship of the Περὶ ἀκουστῶν is far from certain (see Petrucci 2011 
p. 190 n. 23, and p. 193). Since according to the Problemata light is a body, this section 
cannot be attributed to Aristotle. This is (indirectly) confirmed by Plutarch, who evidently 
does not know that the topic of night hearing had been already investigated by Aristotle. As 
a matter of fact, Ammonius recognizes that only the problem of internal/external sound was 
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the several doubts that Boethus’ argument could arouse,36 I believe it is 
clearly consistent with the fundamental principles of atomism. For this 
reason, it seems to me that the argument is not at all confused, but rather 
that it connects (in an orthodox manner) these issues of acoustic physics to 
atoms and void: when there is more void (according to Boethus, at night, 
when the heat thins out and gives way to the cold), sound (or, more cor-
rectly, the atoms of sound) propagate better.  
On the basis of Boethus’ strictly physical explanation, I will now return 
to Plutarch’s presentation of the Epicurean philosopher. It has been argued 
that Boethus categorically denied his (youthful) involvement in geometry 
(even considering it «une erreur de jeunesse») after his final conversion to 
Epicureanism.37 Boethus’ case closely resembles that of another Epicurean 
philosopher with a past as a mathematician: Polyaenus of Lampsacus, one 
of the kathegemones or andres (“leaders”) of Epicurus’ Garden.38 From Ci-
cero (Acad. II 106 = 39 Tepedino Guerra) we learn that Polyaenus was a 
magnus mathematicus; later, following Epicurus (posteaquam Epicuro ad-
sentiens), he came to regard all geometry as false (totam geometriam falsam 
esse credidit), but – and this is the more relevant point – never lost the 
mathematical knowledge he had acquired. The truthfulness of this account 
is indirectly confirmed by a work of the Epicurean Demetrius Laco entitled 
Πρὸς τὰς Πολυαίνου ἀπορίας, For (or On) the Aporiai of Polyaenus (PHerc. 
1429).39 The aporiai to which the title alludes are in all likelihood of geo-
metric nature too; it is reasonable to think, then, that Demetrius may have 
authored this work in support of the difficulties raised by Polyaenus against 
a kind of geometry that obviously did not respect the grounds of Epicurean 
philosophy. This is (perhaps) the reason why, according to Cicero, Poly-
aenus totam geometriam falsam esse credidit: of course, it is necessary to 
understand which geometry this is. The fact that Polyaenus believed all geo-
!
solved by Aristotle (720D). It is very likely, therefore, that Plutarch read a text of the Proble-
mata different from the version we know: it is difficult (if not impossible) to establish 
whether the version used by Plutarch was close to that directly drawn up by Aristotle, or 
was an edition of Aristotle’s work expanded by his successors (see Sandbach 1982 p. 224; 
and Braccini and Pellizer 2014, p. 28, and p. 222).  
36. Some of these perplexities (raised mainly by Teodorsson 1996, p. 186-189) seem 
overly severe and often essentially unjustified, as rightly detected by Braccini and Pellizer 
2014, p. 225-227. 
37. See Puech 1994. The same has been argued for Polyaenus: for example, according to 
Brittain 2006, p. 133, Polyaenus was an Epicurean philosopher «who had been a geometer 
before he met Epicurus».  
38. See Longo Auricchio 1978. 
39. See Angeli and Dorandi 1987, 2008, Del Mastro 2014a, p. 302-305, and now 
Dorandi 2015, p. 6-9. 
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metry to be false without ever losing his mathematical knowledge after his 
Epicurean “conversion” does not necessarily entail that he no longer used 
his (duly “modified”) knowledge in favour of Epicurus’ philosophy.40 
Among the Herculaneum scrolls, PHerc. 1044 contains an anonymous 
Life of Philonides, perhaps attributable to Philodemus. From some of the 
fragments of this work we learn that the Epicurean Philonides was in-
terested in geometry and also wrote (possibly exegetical) works on the Epi-
curean notion of minimum from a geometrical perspective (fr. 13 inf.-14 
Gallo).41 In the Preface to Book 2 of his Κωνικά (I, p. 192 Heiberg), Apol-
lonius invites his addressee Eudemus of Pergamum to send his treatise also 
to Philonides, who in this passage is significantly called ὁ γεωμέτρης, which 
is exactly how Plutarch describes Boethus in De Pyth. or. 396D-E.42  
I would argue that it is rather simplistic (and historically short-sighted) 
to think that Polyaenus, Philonides and Demetrius are isolated cases 
within the history of Epicureanism, but this does not rule out the existence 
of other Epicurean philosophers who completely aim to refute geometry. If 
we carefully examine the passage from De Pythiae oraculis, the fact that 
Plutarch says that now Boethus is on Epicurus’ side seems to imply that he 
disowned his past as a geometer. Plutarch is emphasizing Boethus’ com-
plete “conversion” to Epicurus’ philosophy: in the passage of Plutarch’s 
Table-Talk, Book 8, this “conversion” is clearly confirmed by the opposi-
tion between νέος μὲν ὢν and νυνὶ δέ. What is more complex is the presenta-
tion of Boethus in Book 8 of Table-Talk. Boethus states that in his youth 
he behaved in the manner of the sophists and, above all, that he used the 
postulates of geometry and accepted unproved hypotheses, while now, as 
an Epicurean, he accepts principles demonstrated by Epicurus.43 This pre-
sentation may seem rather “innocent”, but it really says a lot: in order to 
understand it thoroughly, one must compare it with what Proclus argues in 
his Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s “Elements”. 44 
According to Proclus, most of those who have spoken out against 
geometry (πρὸς γεωμετρίαν) have questioned the “consistency” of the prin-
ciples on which geometry is based. The speeches of these detractors of geo-
metry have been “repeated” by many people, and most notably by the 
Ephectics, who reject and deny all knowledge (πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη) through the 
!
40. See Verde, 2013a, p. 266-277, and p. 287-299. 
41. See Verde 2013a, p. 277-287. 
42. See above, p. 211, and n. 11. 
43. Although Plutarch talks about the principles demonstrated by Epicurus, one should 
not overlook the fact that Epicurus himself criticized the use of demonstration (see e.g. 
Hrdt. 37-38). On this issue see now the significant contribution by Morel 2015. 
44. Procl. In Eucl. 199-200; 214-218 Friedlein (= 27 Angeli-Colaizzo = 46-47 
Edelstein-Kidd). 
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suspension of judgment. Others, instead, only wish to challenge and refute 
geometric principles, as is the case with the Epicureans; others still, while 
admitting the principles of geometry, believe that what follows these prin-
ciples (τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχάς) cannot be demonstrated (ἀποδεικνύσθαι) if not 
by adding something further (which obviously is not contained in the prin-
ciples themselves). Zeno of Sidon, a follower of Epicurus’ αἵρεσις, sup-
ported this perspective: Posidonius wrote an entire book (ὅλον [...] βιβλίον) 
to prove that Zeno’s thought was weak and flawed (σαθρὰν αὐτοῦ πᾶσαν 
τὴν ἐπίνοιαν). 
The criticism of Zeno revolves around the issue of the principles: if 
these axioms were really “complete”, what stems from them would not re-
quire further additions. What Zeno refutes – in turn being disproved by 
Posidonius – is the adequacy and completeness of geometric principles. It 
is true, therefore, that Zeno admits and accepts the principles of geometry 
(unlike the other Epicureans mentioned by Proclus);45 but according to his 
formulation these principles “lack” what ought to be added to them in 
order to demonstrate the validity of the propositions which follow on from 
them. One must also bear in mind that the question of the principles of 
science seems to be precisely the point that the Epicureans criticize in their 
rebuttal of the sciences. A passage from Cicero (Fin. I 21, 71 = 227 Us.) is 
particularly enlightening: the reason why it is not necessary to cultivate the 
sciences is a genuinely epistemological one according to the Epicureans, 
since the sciences, being based on false assumptions, cannot be true (a falsis 
initiis profecta vera esse non possunt).46 
Returning to Plutarch, Boethus’ position seems at first glance rather 
similar to that of Zeno (at least judging from Proclus’ account). Boethus 
once accepted the postulates of geometry and used unproved hypotheses, 
but now, having understood that this methodology is probably fallacious 
and unproductive, has thought to adopt the principles demonstrated by 
Epicurus. Both Zeno and Boethus criticize from the Epicurean side the 
accuracy and completeness of the postulates especially from the epis-
temological point of view. Boethus, in particular, seems to reject the idea 
that geometry should be based on unproved hypotheses: that is why he as-
sumes the principles demonstrated by Epicurus.  
!
45. It is not easy to understand whether the Epicureans quoted by Proclus, and Zeno 
have the same purpose, which is the complete refutation of geometry. Proclus clearly dif-
ferentiates Zeno’s position about geometry from that of the Epicureans, but, even though 
Proclus does not say so explicitly, the possibility that the Epicureans and Zeno have dif-
ferent strategies for the same goal cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless the idea that the stra-
tegies (and consequently the goals) of Zeno and the Epicureans are different indeed seems 
to me a more convincing interpretation (see Verde 2013a, p. 304-306). 
46. See Verde 2013a, p. 299-306; on Zeno of Sidon see now Del Mastro 2014b. 
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The actual problem is to understand whether Boethus totally rejected 
geometry. It is not so easy to draw a certain conclusion about Boethus’ po-
sition on geometry. An analysis of the little evidence from Plutarch in the 
light of surviving Epicurean texts could suggest at first glance not only that 
Boethus may not have rejected geometry completely, but even that he is 
perhaps to be counted among those Epicureans who were interested in geo-
metry and (possibly) applied it to the science of nature in order to give 
certain doctrines a more articulate explanation.47 Although I believe that 
Plutarch’s testimony about Boethus does not in itself strengthen the case 
for a positive Epicurean geometry, given that there is no strong evidence 
for this, the view that the Epicurean philosopher did not reject the metho-
dology of geometry is an exegetical possibility based on the fact that Plutarch 
is not completely clear on this point. On this matter, David Sedley offered 
to me (per litteras) an interesting remark: «At 720E-F it seems to me that 
Boethus does not clearly reject the methodology of geometry. He does not 
say explicitly that he now only uses demonstrated doctrines of Epicurus (ac-
tually doctrines demonstrated by Epicurus would be more accurate here), 
just that on this occasion he will be using the latter. His point could simply 
be that the Epicurean method of using pre-demonstrated premises is su-
perior to the geometrical method of using undemonstrated – or perhaps 
rather, more positively, ‘indemonstrable’ – premises, without meaning that 
the latter method is invalid and should be abandoned.» Nevertheless we 
do not have clear evidence that could validate this view completely. In his 
explanation of acoustic physics, Boethus does not explicitly refer to geo-
metric doctrines (but we cannot exclude that he may have done so in other 
circumstances). One ought to bear in mind that, all in all, Plutarch is a very 
hostile source on the Epicureans, and that he therefore may have mis-
represented or consciously ignored certain points. On this matter, I find in-
teresting a suggestion that I received (per litteras) by Jean-Baptiste Gou-
rinat:  
!
47. It is not a coincidence, then, that Boethus, at the very beginning of his speech, im-
mediately states the basic principles of Epicurean atomism and, above all, deals with a 
physical problem. In Epicureanism geometry seems to have a privileged field of application, 
that is, the science of nature (see above, p. 210 and n. 6). What is very significant from this 
point of view is a passage from Sextus Empiricus’ Against the Geometers (M III 98 = 273a, 
p. 351 Us.) where Sextus presents an Epicurean definition of straight line: this definition is 
particularly interesting because it involves the (physical) notion of void. According to the 
Epicureans, the straight line in the void does not turn, because void does not allow 
movement neither in its wholeness nor in its parts. It is possible that this definition has to 
do with the clinamen, or swerve of atoms. In this passage, however, the close relationship 
between geometry and physics according to the Epicureans emerges very clearly. 
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Sur la géométrie pratiquée par Boéthos une fois devenu épicurien, il y a 
peut-être quelque éclairage à gagner en comparant la solution proposée par 
Boéthos au problème d’acoustique posé par Ammonius avec la façon, rap-
pelée par ce dernier, dont ce problème est résolu par le ps.-Aristote : rai-
sonnant, d’une façon qui peut être considérée comme “géométrique”, sur la 
dispersion ou la concentration de flux d’air, le ps.-Aristote traite le 
problème à un niveau macroscopique, tandis que Boéthos raisonne sur les 
variations de taille des atomes en fonction de la température – la question 
étant de savoir, une fois de plus, s’il s’agit là de géométrie, et non pas d’une 
explication physique proposée en alternative à une explication “géo-
métrique”.  
This suggestion is very stimulating, although in his speech on acoustics 
Boethus does not seem clearly to use geometry to explain the issue.  
Furthermore, one could also note a basic element of dissimilarity bet-
ween Zeno’s and Boethus’ views about geometry. The sources are very 
scarce, and it is very difficult to ascertain if Boethus after his Epicurean 
“conversion” continued to use an alternative Epicurean geometry: if this 
were indeed proved, Boethus’ position would be very similar to Philonides’ 
and Demetrius’ one. However, from Plutarch we learn that Boethus does 
not use postulates from geometry anymore: he prefers to start from Epi-
curean demonstrated principles. His criticism seems indeed stronger than 
Zeno’s: Boethus does not supplement geometrical postulates with other 
geometrical (more complete and adequate) premises needed to prove the 
conclusions, since he does away with geometrical postulates. My final view 
is indeed that Boethus’ position is essentially identical to the view of the 
Epicureans quoted by Proclus.  
Even if Boethus’ view were similar to Zeno’s, according to Plutarch, it 
does not seem a position aimed at preserving part of geometry for Epi-
curean purposes. In Plutarch we have a text saying that Boethus used to 
practice geometry, and that he then replaced it with Epicurean philosophy. 
One can weaken or qualify what Plutarch says by comparing Boethus to 
Philonides (or Demetrius), but one can also use what Plutarch says about 
Boethus to strengthen the idea that Epicureans were strictly hostile to 
geometry. Nevertheless, according to Plutarch’s evidence, the fact that 
Boethus does not use geometry in his explanation of sound is an argument 
for thinking, exactly as Plutarch says when he introduces him, that Boethus 
replaced geometry with Epicurean physics, by abandoning geometrical 
reasoning and principles.  
To conclude, Boethus is an interesting figure within Imperial Epi-
cureanism, and we must be grateful to Plutarch for having informed us of 
his philosophical position. It seems probable that Plutarch’s depiction of 
Boethus does not provide new evidence in favour of the existence of a posi-
tive Epicurean geometry. The case that Boethus did develop a positive Epi-
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curean geometry seems much weaker than the case that other Epicurean 
philosophers — like Demetrius Laco and Philonides — did so. Never-
theless, despite the great scarcity (and the rather limited clarity) of sources, 
I would like to reaffirm that Boethus is an interesting figure, since his 
depiction in Plutarch (who remains a hostile source for Epicureanism) does 
not seem to support the idea that the Epicureans did not at all reject their 
(possible) education as geometers. In fact unlike Boethus, other Epi-
cureans, like Philonides, Demetrius, and, perhaps, already Polyaenus, in all 
likelihood dealt with very technical disciplines such as geometry – suitably 
redefined by them according to the principles of the philosophy of 
Epicurus – but would engage in them only on condition that doing so 
would contribute to achieving the goal of the happy life. At least on the 
basis of Plutarch’s evidence, it is not plausible to attribute the same view to 
Boethus. However, it is worthy of remark, on the one hand, that Boethus is 
an Epicurean philosopher in whom there is somehow a (hostile) relation-
ship between geometry and Epicurus’ philosophy, and, on the other hand, 
that the case of Boethus might suggest the possibility that within Epi-
cureanism there was indeed a philosophical debate about geometry and its 
use, as, after all, Proclus’ testimony confirms by differentiating the view of 
the Epicureans from the view of Zeno on the issue of the principles of geo-
metry.48 
!  
!
48. See above, p. 222. 
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